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C E S E U , U n iv e rs id a d d e L a H a b a n a
he logic of the U.S. War on Terror permeates the current
debate in both Cuba and the United States over the
relationship between the two countries. Key questions in an
analysis of the relationship hover around which of the postSeptember 11 variables are the most important in identifying
future bilateral possibilities between Cuba and the United States.
Of course, a full analytical model attempting to explain
Cuban-U.S. relations must take into account external and
domestic factors, and the relevant actors in both nations who
have contributed to making the relationship into a
confrontational one. The aim here is more limited. This paper
will focus on the context in which the two States relate to each
other today.
A relevant factor to this reflection concerns the formation of
the Cuban State under U.S. intervention and occupation, and the
reinforcement of Cuban nationhood with a Constitution that
provided for a Damocles’ sword: the Platt Amendment. Under
the assumption that Cubans were not capable of running their
own government, the United States required that the Platt
Amendment be included in the Constitution of the young
Republic in return for granting Cuba its nominal freedom. The
Platt Amendment granted to the United States the unlimited
right to intervene in Cuban internal affairs. This left an imprint
on Cuba’s national consciousness and a vision of the United
States: no matter the circumstances, the potent neighbor always
would be a cardinal power which Cubans had to take into
consideration in creating any national design.
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In structural terms, the above reflection unveils the roots
and nature of the Cuban-U.S. conflict, sovereignty vs.
domination, which existed even before the 1898 U.S. intervention
into Cuba’s war of independence. While Cuban visionaries spoke
of independence around the time of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine,
the idea of annexing Cuba enjoyed political support in the United
States. Indeed John Quincy Adams compared Cuba to an apple,
saying the island would gravitate naturally to the United States
just as "ripe fruit" has no choice but to fall to the ground. U.S.
leaders already thought of Cuba as an extension of U.S. territory.1
Present Cuba-U.S. relations embody a similar conflict of
national goals. Cuba has asserted that its sovereignty is a goal of
the highest priority, and it has labored vigilantly to safeguard its
independence from external domination. Meanwhile, the United
States has defined its national interests in accord with the claim
that it has the undisputed right to dominate the affairs of all
Latin America countries. This dichotomy—sovereignty vs.
domination—explains the continuity of a policy of punishment
and hostility against Cuba which the U.S. government has
pursued despite the end of the so-called Cold War.
While the East-West conflict might seem like an appropriate
framework for reviewing these hostile relations, it actually
obscures the essential Cuban-U.S. conflict since 1959: Cuba’s
pursuit of sovereignty vs. the U.S. pursuit of domination. Still
Cold War ideology did provide the language and rationale for
U.S. policy. Thus when the Cold War ended, and the Soviet
Union collapsed, it seemed as if a thaw in Cuban-U.S relations
SUMMER 2007 NO. 10

could be possible, because a substantially new international
context existed.
C U B A P O L IC Y IN T H E C O N T E X T O F
T H E W A R A G A IN S T T E R R O R IS M
The world system went through a transitional stage of about ten
years, as U.S. political and military leadership acted in a unipolar
manner and attempted to play a hegemonic international role,
which reached a pinnacle following the September 11th terrorist
attacks. The slogan of a “global war on terrorism” and its
conceptualization filled the vacuum created when the prior
“enemy” disappeared with the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
The terrorist events and the consequent tragedy in human,
material, and political terms of September 11, 2001 constituted
unprecedented events in U.S. history. Without doubt, the attacks
were a wake-up call that resulted in a re-evaluation of the
concepts and priorities of U.S. foreign and security policy.
Despite the end of the Cold War, the new policies flowing from
the events of September 11 maintained laws and practices from
the Cold War period. The attacks have had a direct impact on all
U.S. domestic, foreign, and security policies, and ultimately they
will have contributed to a total restructuring of the entire
international relations system.
With its new “crusade against terrorism,” the Bush
Administration revived a 1982 classification of states in terms of
whether they are alleged “sponsors of international terrorism.”
Notably, in 2001 Afghanistan was not listed as such a state. But
Cuba is a target of this campaign now in part because it is on the
list. Counter-evidence about Cuba’s behavior falls on deaf ears in
the Bush Administration.
To link Cuba with international terrorism on the basis of
easily discredited information, weakens the U.S. effort when
confronting real terrorist threats.2 These claims also trivialize the
credibility of the U.S. war on terrorism, and obscure legitimate
concerns which the United States and Cuba ought to investigate
bilaterally.
The events of September 11 engendered a new evaluation of
U.S. diplomatic ties to all countries. However, the four-decadesold tumultuous relations between Washington and Havana
remained stubbornly unchanged in part because of the terrorist
attacks. For example, U.S. unilateral economic sanctions against
Cuba, such as the restrictions on the sale of medicine and food to
the island, have been justified on the basis of Cuba’s inclusion on
the list of states sponsoring terrorism. U.S. officials such as James
Cason, former chief of mission at the U.S. Interests Section in
Havana, must believe that repetition of a lie will lead the public
ultimately to accept its validity. He has argued erroneously that
Cuba “missed the opportunity to join the international coalition
against terrorism,” which, he says, “will further isolate Cuba and
solidify its status as a rogue state.3
In reality, the Cuban government officially condemned the
terrorist attacks on the afternoon of September 11, 2001.4 It then
offered to provide the United States with all the medical and
humanitarian aid it could muster, and the use of Cuban airspace
for U.S. aircraft.5 (The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, for
reasons of national security, closed U.S. airspace shortly after the
attacks.) On September 15, the Cuban government organized a
rally of thousands of persons to condemn the attacks and show
support for the U.S. people.6 This was followed on September 22
by President Fidel Castro’s categorical condemnation of terrorism
as an “ethically indefensible phenomenon that should be
eliminated.” He also declared that Cuba was ready to “cooperate
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with all the other countries in its total elimination” and added
“Cuba would never permit its territory to be used for this type of
action against the U.S. people.”7 He underscored emphatically
that Cuba would declare itself “never to be an enemy of the U.S.
people.” Five weeks later, following an anthrax attack on the U.S.
Congress, Cuba offered to deliver to the U.S. government 100
million tablets of Cipro, an effective antibiotic against anthrax.
On November 12, it offered low cost, Cuban-made devices to
detect and eliminate anthrax. These measures of support elicited
little or no acknowledgment from U.S. officials. Most newspapers
and news broadcasts also overlooked Cuba’s offers of aid and
concern for U.S. citizens in their time of distress.
When the U.S. government called for an international
coalition in the struggle against terrorism, the Cuban government
argued that the struggle should be waged through the United
Nations (UN). In a letter to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan,
President Castro promised Cuba’s complete cooperation with
initiatives to eliminate terrorism undertaken through multilateral
institutions. By October 2001, Cuba had ratified twelve UN
resolutions against terrorism which had stemmed from the
September 11 attacks.8
Shortly afterward, on November 29, 2001, the chief Cuban
diplomat in Washington delivered a memorandum to the State
Department’s Director of the Office of Cuban Affairs, which
summarized the various Cuban offers of assistance to the United
States. This gesture was intended to stimulate negotiations on
three bilateral agreements under which Cuba and the United
States would have worked collaboratively to deal with issues of
concern to both: illegal immigration and the smuggling of
persons, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism. The proposals used
existing accords with European and Caribbean countries as their
guideline.
On December 3, 2001, while Cuban and U.S. delegates
celebrated the signing of a new migration agreement, Ricardo
Alarcon, president of the Cuba’s National Assembly of People’s
Power, presented the same three proposals to the U.S. delegation.
But the U.S. representatives asserted that they had authority only
to discuss the migration agreement, and that the proposals had to
be presented through other diplomatic channels. In turn, on
March 12, 2002, Cuba formally presented three proposals to the
United States dealing with immigration, the interdiction of drug
trans-shipments, and the fight against terrorism. The Bush
administration’s lack of a response indicates that it had no
interest in discussing the proposed bilateral settlements suggested
by the Cuban government.
As the war in Afghanistan began, the United States started to
ship alleged “enemy combatants” to the U.S. Naval Base at
Guantánamo Bay, which is located on Cuban territory. Though it
has been under U.S. jurisdiction since the 1898 war for Cuban
independence, the naval base was effectively isolated after the
1959 Cuban Revolution. While U.S. possession of the base has
been a longstanding point of disagreement between the two
countries, Cuba avoided a confrontation in regard to the use of
this prison camp. Cuban officials continued to criticize the
inhumane and illegal detentions, but Cuba’s measured response
to the unilateral U.S. decision to use Guantánamo Naval Base was
viewed internationally as a welcome moment of quiet
collaboration and positive diplomacy between the two countries.
General Raúl Castro Ruz, minister of the Cuban Armed
Forces, stated on January 19, 2002 that, over the last few years, a
climate of mutual respect and cooperation surrounding the
Guantánamo Naval Base has been developed.9 He underscored
that this minimal contribution was “an example of what could be
17

attained in other such areas,” and commented that the new
environment could aid the fight against drugs and terrorism,
issues on which Cuba “differed from the U.S. over methods.”10
The Bush Administration, though, had little interest in
acknowledging the possibility of an accommodation with Cuba.
It even ignored the irony of sending prisoners accused of
terrorism to Cuba’s disputed base at Guantanamo while the
Department of State considered Cuba to be a state-sponsor of
terrorism.11

Gate is closed to the maximum security prison at Camp Delta 2 & 3, at the
Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Base, Cuba, April 5, 2006. Photo by Reuters. Courtesy
of www.chinadaily.com.cn

Indeed, Undersecretary of State John Bolton intensified U.S.
accusations against Cuba on the eve of former U.S. president
Jimmy Carter’s May 2002 visit to Cuba. Bolton claimed that Cuba
had “provided dual-use biotechnology to other rogue states” and
expressed his concern that this technology would be used to
“support BW [biological weapons] programs in those states.”12
His charges were unsubstantiated, and the State Department’s
own 2002 report on terrorism makes no mention of any Cuban
biological weapons capability.13 Carter, himself, stated publicly
that Bush administration officials had repeatedly assured him
that there was no evidence Cuba had supplied other countries
with technology for manufacturing weapons of mass
destruction.14 It appeared that the only reason the Bush
administration raised the alleged threat of Cuban terrorism at
that moment was to deflate any possibility that Carter’s trip
might help to relax tension between the two countries.
The entire affair had become so uncontrolled and
inflammatory that the Senate Western Hemisphere Affairs
Subcommittee asked Bolton to explain his lie in testimony. But
Secretary of State Colin Powell sent Carl Ford, who was head of
the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research and
had a reputation for judiciousness, in Bolton’s place. During the
June 2002 hearing, Ford repeated what he had said at an earlier
Senate meeting, that Cuba only has “a limited developmental
offensive biological warfare research and developmental effort”
and not a “program”. He added that “it’s not at the top of my
priority list in terms of the greatest threats posed to the United
States.”15
Later in 2002, a new unsubstantiated allegation of Cuban
perfidy arose when Daniel Fisk, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for the Western Hemisphere, charged that Cuban agents
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systematically had approached U.S. officials with false warnings
“about pending terrorist attacks against the United States and
other Western interests.”16 His claim emerged again in the State
Department’s Global Terrorism Report: “On repeated occasions,
for example, Cuba sent agents to US missions around the world
who provided false leads designed to subvert the post-September
11 investigation.”17
But foreign policy matters concerned President Bush less
than politics at home as the 2002 election loomed on the
horizon. In May he returned Cuba policy to the realm of a
domestic electoral game by announcing a proposed Initiative for
a New Cuba. The initiative was transparently a sop to the hard
line Cuban-American community in an attempt to gain its
support for the 2002 reelection campaign of his brother, Florida
Governor Jeb Bush, and for Bush’s own 2004 campaign.18
Promising to veto any new proposal which would expand trade
relations or would lift restrictions on travel to Cuba by U.S.
citizens to Cuba, the president bellowed that “Fidel Castro ought
to open Cuba’s political and economic systems by allowing nonCommunist candidates to participate in next year’s legislative
elections and the development of independent trade unions.”19
President Bush’s veto threat also was intended to restrain
members of Congress who saw their own electoral fortunes tied
to opening the Cuban market for their districts. Beginning in
2000, there was increasing pressure from Congress to change U.S.
policy, and several conservative legislators in the president’s party
had sponsored measures to relax economic sanctions against
Cuba. They were the key actors in securing passage of The Trade
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TRSA) of 2000,
which was the most far-reaching attenuation of the blockade in
more than forty years. The TRSA legalized the direct commercial
export of food and agricultural products from the United States
to Cuba.
Though the sales required special licensing procedures, and
the products could be purchased on a cash-only basis or with
financing obtained through a third country entity, an enormous
barrier had been breached. From December 2001 to December
2002, U.S. agricultural sales to the island rose to more than $255
million.20 This placed Cuba in thirtieth place of the 228
countries which import food and agricultural products from the
United States, compared with 180th place in 2000 and 138th
place in 2001.21 By the end of the first quarter of 2004, the
accumulated U.S. sales to Cuba since late 2001 was $718
million.22
A majority of both parties, in both chambers of Congress,
also had voted to allow increased travel to Cuba, even if that
meant barring the Treasury Department from enforcing the law.
But unresolved differences in House and Senate versions, and a
legislative sleight of hand by Majority Leader Tom DeLay (Texas)
in one instance, kept these proposals from final passage. President
Bush evidently was not disposed to listen to the increasingly
bipartisan clamor on Capitol Hill which favored the lifting of
sanctions against Cuba. Instead, the White House hardened its
animosity toward Cuba by resorting to rationales which were
increasingly implausible.

RELATIONS BETWEEN CUBA AND THE
UNITED STATES AFTER THE U.S.
INVASION OF IRAQ
The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, its quick defeat of Iraq’s armed
forces, and the subsequent occupation of Iraq, displayed the brute
force and technological wizardry of the U.S. military which
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undergirded U.S. power. In the process of these interventions,
■ Flagrant human rights violators.25
force was reborn as the instrument of power which the United
■ Countries with aggressive intelligence operations on U.S.
States was willing to use against those states it unilaterally
territory.26
characterized as “rogue”. U.S. officials claim that threats from
■ States trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation and
non-state actors—supported by rogue states—legitimate U.S.
forced labor (Victims of Trafficking and Violence
aggression, in order to stop emerging threats before they
Protection Act).27 Cuba was included in this group for the
materialize. Asserting that such preventive attacks by the United
first time in June 2003.
States are in fact “pre-emptive” strikes, the Bush Administration
Moreover, the National Intelligence Council and the CIA
has sought to legalize its crude seizure of territory for geohave identified 25 allegedly unstable countries—one of which is
economic and geo-political gains in terms of a hegemonic
Cuba—where U.S. intervention might be required.28 Cuba also is
power’s moral need to bring
characterized as an “outpost of
about “regime change” when
tyranny,”29 which makes it an
the international system is
opportune target under the terms
" T h e in v a s io n o f Ira q e s t a b l i s h e s a
threatened.
of the Bush doctrine. The U.S.
c le a r w a rn in g to C u b a th a t th e
This overbearing
president declared in his second
U n ite d S t a t e s h a s m o v e d to t h e
philosophy, increases the
inaugural address that “it is the
potential for a rapid and lethal
policy of the United States to seek
u l t i m a t e e x t r e m e In its r a n g e o f
show of power. With its origins
and support the growth of
o p t i o n s a g a i n s t a n y g o v e r n m e n t it
in neo-conservative precepts
democratic movements and
u n i l a t e r a l l y d e f i n e s a s a n ‘e n e m y ’...
about the necessity of
institutions in every nation and
D e e m e d a ro g u e s ta t e , C u b a fin d s
demonstrating rapid and lethal
culture, with the ultimate goal of
power, the unscrupulous use of
ending tyranny in our world” and
i ts e lf o n f iv e b l a c k l i s t s w h i c h t h e
pretexts such as the alleged
set the idea that “The future of
U n i t e d S t a t es c r e a t e d u n i l a t e r ally
threat which the Iraqi regime
America and the security of
t o r e i n f o r c e its r h e t o r i c a n d
posed for U.S. security under
America depends on the spread of
p r o p a g a n d a , a n d to p ro v id e a n
the presumption that it held
liberty”.30
a p p a r e n t ju s tific a tio n fo r a n
an arsenal of WMDs,
Cuba’s fabricated return to
illustrates how the Bush
the U.S. security circle, and the
a g g r e s s i v e p o lic y o f r e g im e
Administration camouflaged
attempts to erode any succession
c h a n g e .»
the core doctrine of “regime
plans on the island and to hasten
change” within the global war
the end of the Cuban regime, are
on terrorism. Such a posture
the cornerstones of U.S. policy
allows little space for positive
towards Cuba. The Bush
dialogue between Cuba and the United States.
Administration defines “regime change” as the basis for
expanding its global hegemony, unilaterally employing a series of
The designated “rogue states,” just like those considered part
of the “Axis of Evil” (Iraq, Iran, North Korea) and “Beyond the
public instruments and resources that leave little space for
positive dialogue with Cuba, even with respect to vital issues.
Axis of Evil” (Cuba, Syria, Libya), were together with Sudan states
which the State Department deemed as state sponsors of
terrorism. (Libya was recently removed from the list.) They are all
T H E F IR S T R E P O R T O F T H E S O C A L L E D
are part of the South, which is a different variable in U.S. strategic
“ C O M M I S S I O N F O R A S S IS T A N C E T O A
thought, above all if we compare it to the Cold War period when
FREE CUBA”
an East-West axis was the main reference point.
October
10 is the anniversary of the beginning of the Cuban War
Following the war in Iraq, the gravest consequence for Cuba
of
Independence
against Spain. President Bush pointedly used
would result from the U.S. government’s projection of a new
that
day
in
2003
to
announce the formation of a “Commission
aggressive and expansionist discourse, if it were willing to put it
for
Assistance
to
a
Free
Cuba” (CAFC). Headed jointly by
into practice. The invasion of Iraq establishes a clear warning to
Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Housing and
Cuba that the United States has moved to the ultimate extreme in
Urban Development Mel Martinez, who subsequently became a
its range of options against any government it unilaterally defines
U.S. Senator from Florida and chair of the Republican National
as an “enemy”. The United States now operates at the fringes of
Committee, CAFC was given the charge to present proposals
international law, defying the UN and its Security Council, and
designed to hasten and plan for the “transition to democracy” in
there is no force capable of stopping it. Using the war on
Cuba. President Bush accepted the Commission’s report (CAFC
terrorism unilaterally to achieve hidden foreign policy objectives,
I) on May 6, 2004, in the midst of the presidential electoral
the United States feels it can use or threaten the use of force with
campaign.31
impunity, even when the country it attacks has no links to
At first the proposed sanctions were construed as a mere
terrorism.
attempt to secure the Cuban American vote in southern Florida
Deemed a rogue state, Cuba finds itself on five black lists
in 2004 presidential elections. In fact the commission’s key
which the United States created unilaterally to reinforce its
recommendations were quickly transformed into federal
rhetoric and propaganda, and to provide an apparent justification
regulations, suggesting that the report was not merely an offering
for an aggressive policy of regime change. Cuba is on the
to
right wing Cuban-Americans. It clearly indicates both U.S.
following official lists:
imperialist
aims and the U.S. intention to change the political and
■ Countries which possess “at least a limited, developmental
socioeconomic
regime in Cuba in such a way that the clash over
biological weapons research and development effort.”23
Cuban sovereignty vs. U.S. domination would be settled in favor
■ State sponsors of international terrorism.24
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of domination.32 It envisions not only the kind of government
the United States would be willing to tolerate—as already
indicated by the 1996 Helms-Burton Law—but also the
detailed workings of the “future Cuba”.
Reminiscent of halcyon days in the early twentieth century
when U.S. proconsul governors John R. Brooke, Leonard
Wood, and Charles A. Magoon ruled Cuba, the report
recommends that implementation of its proposed
transformations would be directed by a State Department
representative who would oversee an interim government. It
also calls for a “Transition Coordinator at the State
Department to facilitate expanded implementation of pro
democracy, civil-society building, and public diplomacy
projects for Cuba,”33 as well as the creation of a U.S.-Cuba
Joint Committee on Trade and Investment (JCTI),34 through
which the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, USAID,
Justice, Agriculture, Housing and Urban Development would
make basic decisions about the Cuban economy, including
implementation of a required Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
between Washington and Havana.35
Such arrangements constitute an attempt to project not
only the type of government which the United States would
tolerate as referenced by the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, but
also the detailed functioning of Cuba’s future. This is even
more arrogant than the Platt Amendment, and represents an
irrational revival of the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt
Corollary.
In order to hasten regime change, the report advocates
reducing contact between Cubans and their U.S. relatives—as
well as between Cubans and U.S. citizens in general—by re
defining “close relatives” narrowly, and by dramatically
restricting the frequency, length and allowable cost of Cuban
American family visits to the island.36 Other recommendations
include sharply reducing allowable remittances and gift parcels
of household items and medicines; scaling back educational
travel; and eliminating the category of fully hosted travel.37
The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) published the regulations which emerged from the
Commission’s proposals on June 16, 2004, and they became
effective on June 30, 2004.38
Though Larry Wilkerson, chief of staff to Colin Powell,
called the Commission’s plans “the dumbest policy on the face
of the earth,”39 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice followed
them in 2005 by appointing an obscure former employee of
the House International Relations Committee, Caleb McCarry,
as Cuba transition coordinator. The appointment indicated
that the cornerstones of the Administration’s strategy include
redefining Cuba as a security threat to the United States,
preventing Cuba from developing its own transition plans, and
accelerating the end of the current Cuban regime.
Consequently, any kind of Cuban-U.S. interaction—whether
educational, religious, humanitarian, or commercial—which
could lead to mutual understanding, would challenge the Bush
Administration’s goals for Cuba.
The Cuba transition coordinator and the Department of
State’s Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization have warned
that a Cuban transition might be attended by violence, in
which case the United States would have to undertake a project
of nation building.41 At the same time, a U.S. invasion of
Cuba, once the “transition genie is out of the bottle,” has not
been rejected.42 This hostile posture was reinforced in
December 2005 when Secretary of State Rice stated that it “was
time” for a regime change in Cuba after 46 years of Fidel
20

Castro’s “cruel dictatorship” and announced that Washington
would take new measures to hasten the end of the “oppression”.
The Bush administration’s use of “transformational
diplomacy” and forcible democratization in dealing with Cuba
was under way.
C A F C II A N D C U B A N L E A D E R F ID E L
C A S T R O ’S J U L Y 31 S U R P R I S E
Rice and Cuban-American Commerce Secretary Carlos
Gutierrez replaced Colin Powell and Mel Martinez, respectively,
as co-chairs of CAFC. On July 10, 2006 they ceremoniously
released the Commission’s second report (CAFC II). Joined by
the Cuba transition coordinator, Caleb McCarry, they claimed
success for the 2004 measures, and they offered additional
recommendations to insure that "the Castro regime's
succession strategy does not succeed." The hollowness of their
claims was revealed in a November 15, 2006 audit released by
the General Accountability Office (GAO), the investigative arm
of U.S. Congress, released on its audit on how well USAID's
Cuba program is working. The GAO study found lax oversight
of USAID's programs and "questionable expenditures" which
had resulted in most of the $65 million and the $8 million
earmarked for Cuba democracy assistance programs by USAID
and the State Department, respectively, remained in Miami or
Washington.45 The programs, the GAO concluded, had done
little more than create an anti-Castro economy which financed
activities in the United States - including what some analysts
saw as electoral support from the Cuban American
community.46
CAFC II offers detailed plans for a U.S. occupation, from
reorganizing the economy and the educational system to the
holding of multiparty elections. Though the report’s
recommendations seemed to be the stuff of fantasy, Cuban
officials could not dismiss them easily, because their
publication coincided with organizational changes that
effectively institutionalized U.S. policy towards Cuba. During
the summer and fall of 2006, the Bush administration created
six interagency working groups to monitor Cuba and to use
increased funding to implement U.S. policies more vigorously
in order to bring about “ Cuban regime change”. Three of the
newly created groups—for diplomatic actions, strategic
communications, and democracy promotion—are located in
the State Department.47 A fourth, which coordinates
humanitarian aid to Cuba, is run by the Commerce
Department. The National Security Council and the
Department of Homeland Security are in charge of an
interagency working group which focuses on migration
issues.48 The sixth group, is chaired by the U.S. Attorney for
the Southern District of Florida, and is comprised of members
from OFAC, ICE, FBI, IRS, the Department of Commerce’s
Office of Export Enforcement, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the
Field and Air divisions of Customs and Border Protection.49
Named the “Cuban Sanctions Enforcement Task Force,” it was
formed to investigate violations and enforce energetically
existing U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba.
At about the same time, the intelligence community
restructured the way it monitored Cuba. In August 2006
Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte appointed
CIA veteran Patrick Maher to be acting mission manager for a
new unit which combined and coordinated two separate
departments devoted to Cuba and Venezuela.50 The
significance of these administrative changes is that
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organizational units can take on a life of their own, especially as
professionals gain a vested interest in their new responsibilities.
These actions thus contribute to the maintenance of a hostile
policy.
The most concrete recommendation in CAFC II was the
creation of an $80 million fund—to be known as the Cuba Fund
for a Democratic Future—to “promote democracy” in Cuba. The
report called for at least $20 million be added to the program
every year after the initial two-year period, in addition to the $10
million a year which the State Department and the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID) spend for other
democracy-assistance programs.51 Moreover, CAFC II proposes a
broad array of measures to tighten the enforcement of U.S.
sanctions against the island, from creating another task force to
target Cuba's growing nickel exports, to stopping humanitarian
aid from reaching organizations with alleged links to the

C o m m is s io n f o r
A s s is t a n c e t o a
F ree C uba
R e p o r t t o t h e P r e s id e n t
J uly 2006
CONDOLEEZZA R ICE
S ec r eta r y of S ta te
C h a ir
C a r l o s G u t ie r r e z
S e c r e t a r y o f C o m m e r ce
C o -C h a ir
www.cafc.gov

government, such as the Cuban Council of Churches.52 The
report also advocated amending Presidential Proclamation 5377
“to permit the denial of immigrant, as well as non-immigrant
visas, to officers and employees of the Government of Cuba or
the Communist Party of Cuba.”53 A portion of the report—
included in a secret annex— remains hidden from public scrutiny
for "reasons of national security".54
Supporters of the Bush Administration’s strategy for dealing with
Cuba - i.e., “transformational diplomacy” and forcible
democratization - saw the timing of CAFC II as remarkably
prescient. Only 21 days after it was published, on July 31, 2006,
the Cuban government announced that its ailing leader, Fidel
Castro, had provisionally ceded power to a collective leadership
headed by Raul Castro. The possibility of a transition in Cuba
instantly became palpable. But U.S prognosticators had not
anticipated the scenario which unfolded, in which the Cuban
leader stayed in the background while a group of seasoned
policymakers coordinated the continuity of the Cuban Project.
Though the Cuban system showed no instability in the wake
of President Castro’s illness, the turn of events did force
Washington to consider the real consequences of its policy. The
question arose as to whether continuation of punishment of
Cuba served U.S. interests. The Department of Defense, for
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example, had balked at acting too aggressively for fear of igniting
a crisis in the U.S. backyard at a time when U.S. forces already
were stretched thin by the Afghan and Iraq wars. And if
rumblings of instability did begin to emerge from Cuba, it was
hardly clear that Bush’s mindless chants, urging Cubans on the
island to adopt so-called democratic reforms, offered the United
States a meaningful guideline to deal with such a circumstance.
Would the United States try to push the regime over the edge, or
would it help the regime to survive in order to avert chaos 90
miles from south Florida?
What was clearer to Cubans, though, was the way in which
four decades plus of inhumane economic sanctions, and a policy
of increasing hostility, had undermined U.S. claims for a role in
shaping whatever might unfold within Cuban domestic politics
on the island. At the same time, the negative U.S. position in its
historic conflict with Cuba has engendered a spirit of Cuban
nationalism, while the Helms-Burton law, which codified the
sanctions, reduced Washington's options. Helms-Burton
established the criteria for a post-Fidel Castro government which
would be acceptable to the United States, and it defined
conditions Cuba had to meet in order for the United States to lift
sanctions. For example, if the Cuban people elected Raul Castro
as their next President, even in a U.S.-style “open” election, the
law requires the sanctions to remain in place. Such limitations on
U.S. policy options constitute an enormous problem. Credible
scenarios leading to chaos and violence can be envisioned if there
were an upsurge in interest from radical right wing segments in
the Cuban-American community. These extremists could well
engage in provocations in order to draw the United States and
Cuba into a direct conflict.

NOTES FOR REFLECTION
While policy making in Cuba has always taken U.S. politics into
serious consideration, Cuba has not been, in the short or
medium term, a political priority for the United States. This fact
has constrained the debate on U.S. Cuba policy for more than 45
years. As a consequence, those with narrowly-focused interests
traditionally monopolized the discussion about Cuba in the
United States. A reassessment of the Cuban issue, placing it in a
world context, is imperative for the establishment of constructive
relations between the two nations.
Globalization, with its contradictory processes of economic
integration and the marginalization of states, nations, and social
groups, has made it essential to face genuine and universal
problems of terrorism, underdevelopment, pollution, migration,
drug-trafficking, weapons proliferation, and human smuggling,
as well as new challenges to national, regional, and international
security. The geographic, economic, political, and cultural space
that Cuba and the United States share cannot be ignored.
Therefore, agreement on subjects of common concern is in the
short-term interest of both countries. For example, the United
States and Cuba could readily engage in positive-sum
negotiations over issues related to the environment, terrorism,
immigration, and drug trafficking.
Negotiations concerning matters covered by international
laws also could be feasible in the medium term. They might
address issues such as the property claims and counterclaims of
the two governments, the status of Guantanamo naval base, and
the lifting of trade sanctions and restoration of normal trade
relations. This would open the way for consular and diplomatic
relations.
But the sine qua non of negotiations for most people on the
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island is that the United States must respect Cubas sovereignty
and quest for independence. Any U.S. intent to restore
domination over Cuba would violate a fundamental Cuban
national interest. U.S. willingness to abandon such a goal would
be an indication of how seriously Washington sought meaningful
negotiations and a peaceful outcome to any Cuban transition. To
be sure, Cuba also must take into account U.S. national interests
and concerns about regional security. Thus the process by which
the two neighbors could achieve constructive coexistence needs
to begin with mutual respect.
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